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Corporate governance which acts as an effective method to solve the 
problem of agent which is caused by separation of ownership and managing 
power has arose the attention of many countries in a greater degree. Especially 
after the Asian financial crisis every country has agreed on the opinion that 
well corporate governance of commercial bank is the base of controlling 
financial crisis. Companied with decentralization of stock ownership and 
specialization and complication of corporate management control, the center 
of corporate power has begun to transfer. In the case of centralism of managers, 
the paper has attached emphasis on discussing the reasons for power abusing 
of managers with the beginning of the fact that in the bank which acts as a 
special corporation the managers power has continually expanded. On the base 
of analysis we can introduce the advantages of different patterns of 
supervision of managers between American and Germany, in order to put 
forward some legal considerations on perfecting the supervision of managers 
of joint-stock commercial banks. 
As the patterns of supervision are concerned, the internal supervision 
should be paid more attention. In order to strengthen supervision we should 
adopt methods as follows. Optimizing the structure of stock ownership. 
Consummating the function of board of directors. Perfecting the system of 
supervisory board. Paying attention to the restriction of an interested party. In 
the meantime, perfecting the external system of supervision and control should 
not be neglected. Mandatory information disclosure requirements and capital 
market and managers market can play important roles in strengthening 
supervision. When we emphasize supervision mechanism, we should also 















seek the maximization of bank benefit on their own initiative when they seek 
their own benefit. The innovation of the paper is as follows. Putting forward 
view of the structure of managers supervision as a whole. Trying to define 
corporate governance of commercial bank. Posing to establish the 
self-discipline organization and plan the legislation for managers. Raising 
some suggestions to modify the unreasonable law and some details. 
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第一章  银行公司治理的相关理论及其界定 
（二）公司治理提出的背景 






是在 80 年代中期兴起的，其原因主要有以下几点。 
1、美国经济竞争力下降和经理阶层收入过高 
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